Sounding the Alarm on Inflation Indexing and Strict Inflation Targeting by David Eagle & Dale Domian
Sounding the Alarm on Inflation Indexing and Strict Inflation Targeting 
 
David M. Eagle* 
Eastern Washington University 
 
Dale L. Domian 





Unanticipated inflation or deflation causes one party of a nominal contract to gain at the expense 
of the other party, an effect absent in macroeconomic models with one representative consumer 
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Sounding the Alarm on Inflation Indexing and Strict Inflation Targeting 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper reports the existence of “bombs” that have the potential to explode under 
extreme economic stress, wreaking havoc across our already weakened economies.  Almost all 
countries have inflation-indexed contracts, the more common type of bomb.  A less common 
bomb is strict inflation targeting, which exists in some economic systems and is recommended 
by some economists for use in others. While the likelihood that these will explode at a particular 
time is small, we need to plan for such contingencies to make sure our economic systems with 
their contracts survive even under extreme situations. 
Many economists have encouraged inflation-indexed contracts and strict inflation 
targeting because of their attitudes towards inflation and their simplistic views of nominal 
contracts.  Their attitudes towards inflation today are about the same as the attitudes medical 
experts had towards cholesterol twenty years ago when they considered all cholesterol as bad.  
As medical experts then tried to reduce their patients’ cholesterol down to what they considered 
a positive safe level, many economists today recommend that we should strive for a positive 
inflation rate of around one or two percent, and they consider any inflation greater than that 
targeted inflation rate as bad regardless of the source of that inflation. 
This paper is aimed at changing economists’ views of inflation and nominal contracts, 
their goals and objectives concerning inflation, their recommendations concerning the monetary 
and fiscal policies to deal with inflation, and the financial instruments they design to hedge 
against inflation.  Economists need to recognize that there can be both good and bad inflation, 
just as the medical community now recognizes the existence of both good and bad cholesterol.   - 2  - 
Similar to how medical experts today try to reduce their patients’ bad cholesterol while 
maintaining or even increasing their patients’ good cholesterol, economists need to strive to 
reduce or filter out the bad inflation while letting the good inflation fulfill its important allocating 
roles. 
The next section, section 2, discusses scenarios where inflation indexing and strict 
inflation targeting could explode.  Section 3 explains why aggregate-supply-caused inflation or 
deflation is good, while section 4 discusses why aggregate-demand-caused inflation or deflation 
is bad. We further discuss inflation indexing and strict-inflation targeting in sections 5 and 6 
respectively.  We reflect on our conclusions in section 7 and discuss alternatives to pure inflation 
indexing and strict-inflation targeting. 
2. Explosive Scenarios 
To show that our use of the word “bomb” is appropriate to inflation indexing, consider 
the possibility that aggregate supply drops by 50% because of some event such as war, a terrorist 
attack, or a natural event such as pollution from a series of volcanic eruptions or a large 
meteorite hitting the earth.  Assuming no change in nominal aggregate demand, prices would 
double.  Assuming half of the government’s budget is indexed to inflation, the doubling of prices 
would double the nominal payments on its inflation-indexed obligations, completely crowding 
out everything else in its budget.  Raising taxes at such a time of low output is likely to be 
politically unfeasible.  If the drop in aggregate supply is permanent, borrowing would not be a 
viable long-term solution. 
Havoc would exist outside the government as well.  Firms with obligations from 
inflation-indexed bonds they had issued and from inflation-indexed wages would find - 3  - 
themselves squeezed.  On average their nominal revenues would be unchanged (because we 
assumed nominal aggregate demand is unchanged).  However, their nominal inflation-indexed 
obligations on these bonds and wages would have doubled. 
To some extent, contract renegotiations will help mitigate the harmful effects of such an 
extreme situation.  However, those contract renegotiations will be costly and slow because those 
due to receive the inflation-indexed payments will be reluctant to give up those higher payments.  
Also, some inflation-indexed obligations such as those on government inflation-indexed bonds 
cannot be renegotiated. 
We should strive to write our contracts so they can be upheld even under extreme 
circumstances.  Under the above extreme circumstances, nominal contracts would have worked 
quite well because aggregate-supply-caused inflation would have decreased the real value of the 
obligations on these nominal contracts, making those obligations more manageable. 
However, even nominal contracts would have been dysfunctional had the monetary 
authority pursued a strict inflation targeting policy.  Instead of keeping nominal aggregate 
demand constant, a strict-inflation-targeting monetary policy would have responded to a 50% 
drop in aggregate supply with a 50% drop in nominal aggregate demand, leaving the price level 
unchanged.  Therefore, the government’s nominal payments on both its inflation-indexed and 
non-inflation-indexed obligations would not have changed.  However, with a 50% drop in 
nominal aggregate demand, the government’s tax revenue would have dropped by 50% forcing a 
50% cut in its budget if no new taxes or borrowing are forthcoming. 
Similarly, firms without inflation-indexed obligations would also be squeezed.   Their 
nominal contractual obligations would not have changed.  However, if nominal aggregate - 4  - 
demand had fallen 50%, then on average the firm’s revenues would have also fallen 50% once 
again squeezing the corporations' cash flow as well as profitability. 
In some sense, the “bomb” of strict-inflation-targeting is more dangerous than the 
“bomb” of inflation indexing because strict inflation targeting affects all contracts regardless 
whether the contracts are inflation indexed or not.  Thus, someone using conventional contracts 
would have been unable to avoid the havoc caused by strict inflation targeting.  (In the final 
section of this paper, we do discuss a type of indexed contract that can prevent such a squeeze.) 
On the other hand, inflation-indexed contracts are contracts that are not easily broken.  If 
such an extreme situation did arise, there would be time for the monetary authorities to realize 
strict inflation targeting is a mistake and back away from that commitment.  In fact, many central 
banks follow flexible inflation-targeting policies instead of strict ones where they do have escape 
clauses in case of real shocks.
1 However, some central banks such as the Bank of Canada have 
statements supporting inflation targeting with no mention of any such escape clauses (Bank of 
Canada, 2003).
2  Also, some respected economists do recommend strict inflation targeting (e.g., 
Goodfriend, 2003). 
Aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply shifts are the two causes of inflation or 
deflation. The view that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon has blinded many 
economists to the good that inflation can do when aggregate supply changes.
3  Contributing to 
                                                 
1 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 2001, states "The BSP may use escape clauses or arguments to explain deviations of 
actual inflation performance from the target level. This is so because there are other factors affecting inflation that 
are beyond the control of monetary policy, such as changes in tax policy, prices of oil in the world market, and 
natural disturbances that affect food supply." 
2 The Bank of Canada strictly targets the long-run inflation rate not necessarily the short-run inflation rate.  Gavin 
(2003) argues that real shocks in the short run tend to be reversed in the long run.  However, if a substantial real 
shock occurred which was not reversed in the long run, the Bank of Canada’s firm commitment to a long-run 
inflation target would produce the problems we discuss. 
3 One area of economic literature that has recognized the difference between aggregate-demand-caused inflation and 
aggregate-supply-caused inflation is the wage indexation literature begun by Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977).  While 
they did recognize that distinction, that literature has proposed indexing that partially filters out both the good and - 5  - 
this blindness is that many of our macroeconomic or monetary economic models assume one 
representative consumer or consumers who have identical consumption.
4   Such models cannot 
capture the effect that one party of a nominal contract gains at the expense of the other as a result 
of inflation or deflation.  This effect can only be captured in a model of diverse consumers.  The 
next section uses a model of diverse consumers to shine the light onto aggregate-supply-caused 
inflation.  
3. Aggregate-Supply-Caused Inflation and Deflation 
We write this section to show that if aggregate demand does not change, then aggregate-
supply-caused inflation or deflation in conjunction with nominal contracts is “good” in the 
Pareto sense.    As the Appendix shows, in order for a monetary equilibrium to be truly Pareto 
efficient,
5 the model must either assume no money is held from one period to the next, or it must 
assume other extremely unreasonable assumptions.  We choose the first route.  We use a 
monetary-modeling methodology that treats nominal aggregate demand as exogenous or 
stochastically exogenous, but where no money is held from period to period.  So to not distract 
from the major theme of this paper, we just apply that methodology in this section leaving the 
defense of the methodology to the Appendix. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the bad inflation.  Also, the goals and objectives of monetary and macroeconomic literature have not changed in 
light of the discoveries in the wage indexation literature. 
4 For example, Aoki (2001) develops a model in which he argues that strict inflation targeting is Pareto efficient.  
However, consumers in his model always have the same level of consumption.  Therefore, there are no winners or 
losers as a result of inflation. 
5 Some authors have loosely applied the term "Pareto efficiency".  For example, in an economic model which 
includes a market constraint such as a cash-in-advance constraint, the authors may argue that the model is "Pareto 
efficient" since there is no way to make one person better off without making someone worse off without violating 
that market constraint.  The conclusions of the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics are 
much stronger since they assume no such market constraints and yet a competitive market is Pareto efficient.  We 
define true Pareto efficiency as being when the consumption allocation matches the consumption allocation that 
would come from an Arrow-Debreu economy which we know is "truly Pareto efficient."  These other concepts of 
Pareto efficiency are valid concepts, but we would label them as "Pseudo Pareto efficient" so to not distract from the 
more rigorous "truly Pareto efficient."   When this paper uses "Pareto efficient," we mean "truly Pareto efficient". - 6  - 
To facilitate our discussion, imagine a closed economy with one consumption good 
where individuals consume all that good; the good cannot be stored from one period to the next.  
Also, imagine firms producing that consumption good with a constant-returns-to-scale 
production function of labor and land of the form,  ) H , L f( e t t
￿t ~ ~
, where  0 > L f , 0 < LL f , 
0 > H f , 0 < HH f , and where t L
~
 and  t H
~
 are the aggregate amounts of labor and land demanded, 
and  t a is a stochastic term having zero mean and a positive variance.  We model the firm sector 
with one representative price-taking firm that maximizes its profits: 
t t t t t t
￿
t H R L W ) H , L f( e P
t ~ ~ ~ ~
- -   (1) 
where Pt is the price level, Wt is the nominal wage rate, and Rt is the nominal land rent.  The 
necessary and sufficient  conditions for this profit to be maximized are that the real wage rate 
and real land rental rates equal the following: 
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Assume that the supply of labor and land is fixed each period.  Then, (2) and (3) show 
that the real wage rate and the real land discount rate vary with the realization of  t ￿ .  When 
productivity is higher than expected (i.e.,  t ￿  is greater than 0), the real wage rates and real rental 
rates should be higher than in situations when productivity is lower than expected.   If wages and 
rental rates are set prior to the realization of productivity, ideal contracts (contracts that would 
help lead to a Pareto-efficient consumption allocation) should be dynamic rather than static, 
changing the real wage rates and the real land rental rates according to productivity. - 7  - 
Writing such ideal contracts may sound to be too complicated to be very practicable.  
However, writing these contracts to respond to aggregate productivity is quite easy.  By the 
quantity equation (MV=N=PY),  t t t Y P N = , where Nt is nominal aggregate demand at time t.  If 
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These show that the nominal "ideal" wage and land rent are constant as long as nominal 
aggregate demand stays the same.  In other words, contracts that nominally fix wages and land 
rents are ideal contracts under these assumptions. 
  It is good inflation and deflation that makes these nominal contracts so dynamic when 
nominal aggregate demand remains the same.  If productivity rises, aggregate supply increases, 
causing the price level to decrease.  The lower price level causes the real wage and the real land 
rent to increase just as (2) and (3) require.  If productivity falls, aggregate supply decreases, 
causing the price level to increase.  The higher price level causes the real wage rate and the real 
land rent to decrease so that (2) and (3) continue to hold. 
We can also see that aggregate-supply-caused inflation or deflation is good by looking at 
the consumer side of the economy.  Very important for our understanding of how inflation 
affects consumers is what we call the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Functionality Theorem: 
The Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Functionality Theorem: When 
consumers are strictly risk averse and have time additively separable utility - 8  - 
functions and all the consumption good is consumed, then any particular Pareto-
efficient consumption allocation is a function solely of aggregate supply. 
 
The key word here is “function” meaning that it is impossible to have a Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocation where someone’s consumption in a particular period t differs between 
two states of nature with the same level of aggregate supply in period t.  Assume otherwise, that 
for some period t, there exist two states of nature where aggregate supply at time t is the same 
but where during period t at least one individual consumes more in one state than in the other 
state.
6  We will label these two states as states 1 and 2.  Define a new consumption allocation 
where for states 1 and 2 each individual’s consumption equals the average of their original 
consumption in those two different states.  For all other states at time t and for all other time 
periods, the consumption allocation is the same as the original.  Since the goods market clears 
with the original consumption allocation, it must also clear with the newly defined allocation 
making the newly defined allocation feasible.
7  Any strictly risk-averse consumer with different 
consumption in the two states where aggregate supply is the same would prefer their newly 
defined consumption allocation
8 and no one would be made worse off with the newly defined 
allocation.  Therefore, the newly defined consumption allocation is Pareto superior to the 
original allocation, contradicting the statement that the original allocation was Pareto efficient.  
Therefore, by proof by contradiction, the above theorem is true. 
                                                 
6 Actually, if the consumption allocation differs for one consumer, it must also differ for at least one other consumer 
because the sum of the individual’s consumption must equal aggregate supply. 
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8 A strictly risk-averse individual prefers consuming the average of the two different consumption levels in both of 
the states over the uncertainty of the different consumption levels in those two states. - 9  - 
Our using the word “function” can lead to some confusion.  We are not saying that there 
is only one Pareto-efficient consumption allocation; we know there normally should be a 
continuum of Pareto-efficient consumption allocations.  However, in an economy with stochastic 
variables, our specifying any particular Pareto-efficient consumption allocation requires us to 
specify that consumption for all consumers, for all time periods, and for all states of nature.  
Therefore, our specification of this particular Pareto-efficient consumption allocation would be a 
mapping from consumers, time periods, and states to consumption.  Another word for “mapping” 
is “function”.  Aggregate supply itself is a function of the time period and the state. What the 
Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Functionality Theorem says, is that any particular Pareto-
efficient consumption allocation can be written as a function of the consumers, the time periods, 
and aggregate supply leaving the state out of the function even though variables other than 
income may vary with the state of nature. (See footnote 8 for an example to clarify this subtle 
distinction.) 
Throughout this paper, we assume that consumers are strictly risk averse and all the 
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where m is the number of consumers,  t Y is the aggregate supply at time t, and  ) ( ~
t jt Y c is the 
function depicting how j’s consumption in this particular Pareto-efficient consumption allocation 
changes as aggregate supply changes. It is important to recognize that  ) ( ~
t jt Y c is a reduced form.  
It does not represent what we normally think of a consumption function of income.  To help 
keep this distinction straight, we will refer to  t Y  as aggregate supply, not income.  
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  Equation (7) tells us that on average, an individual’s share of a decrease (or increase) in 
aggregate supply equals the proportion of that individual’s consumption to aggregate supply.   
When aggregate supply decreases, in order for one individual’s consumption to decrease by less 
than her proportionate share, some other individual’s consumption must decrease by more than 
his proportionate share.  If this were to happen in a Pareto-efficient economy, in essence a less 
risk-averse consumer would be providing the higher risk-averse consumer with insurance that 
would allow consumption to change less for the higher risk-averse consumer than for the less 
risk-averse consumer. 
Many people think about nominal contracts as simple static contracts.  While nominal 
contracts are static in a nominal sense, they are dynamic in a real sense.  The real dynamics of 
nominal contracts help allocate increases and decreases in aggregate supply across the economy.  
However, we recognize the limitations of nominal contracts.   Unless nominal contracts are 
written as insurance policies, they will usually not provide insurance.  For now, let’s assume that 
there is no need of such insurance by assuming that the consumers' utility functions are such that - 11  - 
for any particular Pareto-efficient consumption allocation, each individual j's consumption at 
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for some constant  jt m ~ .   By (8), we are assuming the constant  jt m ~  cannot change when the state 
of nature changes as long as we stay with the same particular Pareto-efficient consumption 
allocation, the same consumer j, and the same time period t.
10 
We will now show that when nominal aggregate demand does not change, inflation in 
conjunction with nominal contracts will facilitate consumers in planning their consumption 
allocations to be proportional to aggregate supply.  Imagine each consumer j, with his/her 
endowments of labor and land, maximizing the sum of his or her expected utility
11 over time 
subject to the following constraints for each time t=1..T where T is the last period of the 
consumer’s life: 
) i ( B Z H R L W B c P t j,t jt jt t jt t jt jt t 1 1 1 - - + + + + = +   ( 9) 
where Bjt is the amount of the nominal bond j demands at time t, and it is the nominal interest 
rate on that bond.  To simplify our analysis, assume only the consumption good enters the 
consumers’ utility functions.  Neither labor nor land affects utility directly so that all labor and 
land is supplied to the market;  jt L  and  jt H represent the fixed amounts of labor and land 
                                                 
9 Iff consumers have the same relative risk aversion will equation (6) hold (See, Eagle and Domian, 2003). 
10 For example, in an economy consisting of just three consumers – A, B, and C, one such Pareto-efficient allocation 
could be where A, B, and C always respectively consume 90%, 8%, and 2%  of aggregate supply.  Another Pareto-
efficient allocation might be where A, B, and C always respectively consume 10%, 30%, and 60% of aggregate 
supply.  Our assumption of (8) assumes that j's consumption at time t as a proportion of aggregate supply is the same 
regardless of the state of nature as long as we are talking about one particular Pareto-efficient consumption 
allocation. - 12  - 
endowed onto j and hence supplied by j at time t.  An income-distribution system exists that 
taxes some consumers and makes payments to other consumers;  jt Z  represents j’s receipt at time 
t of a receipt from this system, which if negative represents a tax.  We call this distribution 
system “social security”, although the theory could also encompass various welfare systems. 
Assume that these consumers enter into nominal contracts for wages and land rent prior 
to the time when the labor or land services are provided.   The Appendix shows that the 
equilibrium, involving nominal contracts between the consumers described above and the firms 
described earlier, is Pareto efficient when the Pareto-efficient consumption allocation for each 
consumer is proportional to income.  In that equilibrium, the consumer’s investment in bonds 
each period does not depend on the realization of aggregate supply in each period.  To help see 
why nominal contracts facilitate consumers to obtain consumption allocations that are 
proportional to aggregate supply, subtract both sides of (9) by Bjt, replace Pt with Nt/Yt, , and 
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  ( 10) 
Equation (10) shows us that as long as Wt, Rt, and Zjt have been set in previous periods, and Nt 
and Bjt do not vary across states of nature, individual j’s consumption at time t will be 
proportional to aggregate supply since the values of Bj,t-1 and it-1 were known the previous 
period.  Therefore, if consumers know Nt with certainty, they then know a priori the ratio of 
their consumption to aggregate supply. 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 We do assume that each consumer j’s utility function at each time t,  ) ( jt jt c U , is sufficiently well behaved to 
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. - 13  - 
The necessary and sufficient condition for an individual’s consumption to remain a 
constant proportion of aggregate supply is that the individual reduces his/her consumption by the 
same percentage change as the change in aggregate supply.  To see this, let jt m  be the constant 
ratio of consumption to aggregate supply, then  t jt jt Y ￿ c = , which implies that  t jt jt ￿Y ￿ ￿c = .  










  To see more simply how aggregate-supply inflation and nominal contracts can cause the 
percentage change in individuals’ consumption to equal the percentage change in aggregate 






c =   ( 11) 
which implies that  t jt jt P X c ￿ ￿ ￿ - =  where the dot above each variable means the infinitesimal 
percentage change.
12  Therefore, if aggregate supply decreases by 1%, which causes the price 
level to increase by 1%, then j’s consumption will decrease by 1% if the nominal cash inflow j 
receives at time t does not change.  Similarly, if aggregate supply increases by 1%, which causes 
the price level to decrease by 1%, then j’s consumption will increase by 1%.  In both cases, the 
percentage change in consumption matches the percentage change in aggregate supply, resulting 
with the ratio of j’s consumption to aggregate supply staying constant. 
                                                 
12 Leth  represent any variable that may affect the variables of (11).  Taking logarithms of both sides gives 
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which is the same as  t jt jt P X c ￿ ￿ ￿ - = .  Usually, economists treat h  as time but it could actually be any exogenous 
variable, including an abstract unspecified variable as we are using it here. - 14  - 
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Taking the log and differentiating gives: 
jt jt jt jt Y N X c ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + - =   (13) 
This shows that as long as the nominal net cash inflow does not change and nominal aggregate 
demand does not change, the percentage change in consumption will equal the percentage 
change in aggregate supply.  Using differentiation to get the results of (13) only applies to 
infinitesimal changes.  However, if nominal aggregate demand and j’s nominal net cash inflow 
















= .  Hence, as long as nominal aggregate demand and j’s nominal net cash 
inflows do not change, then the percentage change in consumption equals the percentage change 
in aggregate supply for any size change. 
  In conclusion, nominal contracts are not static contracts; in real terms, they are dynamic, 
adjusting their real payments to changes in aggregate supply.  Aggregate-supply-caused inflation 
is good, playing an important role in allocating the effects of changes in aggregate supply across 
the economy.  When Pareto-efficiency requires consumers to proportionately share those 
changes in aggregate supply, nominal contracts are Pareto efficient as long as nominal aggregate 
demand does not change. - 15  - 
4. Aggregate-Demand-Caused Inflation and Deflation 
  When nominal aggregate demand stays the same, nominal contracts work very well to 
allocate changes in aggregate supply across the economy.  However, a stochastic component to  
nominal aggregate demand will cause nominal contracts to work inefficiently.  Remember that 
the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Functionality Theorem states that as long as consumers are 
strictly risk averse and all the consumption good is consumed, any particular Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocation must be a function solely of aggregate supply.   This means that as long 
as aggregate supply remains the same in different states of nature, the Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocation should also be the same in those states of nature. However, unexpected 
changes in nominal aggregate demand will cause changes to the consumption allocation even 
when aggregate-supply remains the same.  Therefore, the resulting changes in consumption 
represent departures from Pareto efficiency. 
With most nominal contracts, one party is obligated to make a monetary payment to the 
other party.  If an unexpected increase in nominal aggregate demand causes inflation to be 
greater than anticipated, the real payment will be less than anticipated.  This will benefit the 
party making the payment but hurt the party receiving the payment.  On the other hand, if an 
unexpected decrease in nominal aggregate demand causes inflation to be less than anticipated, 
the real payment will be more than anticipated.  This will hurt the party making the payment and 
help the party receiving the payment. 
  Assuming they are risk averse, both parties will be a priori worse off given the possibility 
of nominal-aggregate-demand causing this unanticipated inflation or deflation.  They would 
prefer not being exposed to this risk. - 16  - 
5. Inflation-Indexed Contracts 
  The previous section showed that the risk of aggregate-demand-caused unanticipated 
inflation or deflation makes both parties of nominal contracts worse off a priori.   Inflation-
indexing is a way to filter out this inflation, which would make both parties better off as long as 
all inflation is caused by changes in nominal aggregate-demand.  However, the problem with 
inflation indexing is that it filters out all inflation whether caused by aggregate demand shifts or 
aggregate supply shifts. 
The obligations on a contract can be inflation indexed by multiplying the agreed-upon 
base obligations at time t by the ratio of the price level at time t to the base year’s price level.   
For example if W is the contractual base wage rate agreed upon at time t-1, the actual nominal 







W W .  This then results with the real wage rate being a 
constant since 














and since W and Pt-1 are known at time t-1. 
  When aggregate supply remains the same, Figure 1 contrasts how nominal aggregate 
demand affects the consumption levels of contractual parties of an inflation-indexed obligation 
compared to if they had entered into a nominal obligation.   Figure 1 assumes the party receiving 
payment on the obligation relies solely on that payment for her consumption in that period, 
whereas it assumes the party making the payment has resources equal to twice his expected 
consumption.  To normalize the consumption of both parties, Figure 1 divides their actual 
consumption levels by the level of consumption they would experience if nominal aggregate 
demand equals its expected value (Ne). - 17  - 
  With the nominal contract, if nominal 
aggregate demand exceeds its expected value, 
unanticipated inflation takes place, reducing the 
real value of the nominal obligation.  The 
consumption level of the receiver of the nominal 
obligation will decrease, whereas the 
consumption level of the payer will increase as a 
result of this unanticipated inflation. 
  Conversely, if nominal aggregate demand 
is less than expected, then the inflation rate will 
be less than anticipated, increasing the real value 
of the obligation.  This will increase the consumption level of the receiver of the nominal 
obligation, but will decrease the consumption level of the payer of the obligation.  Note that the 
payer of the obligation could actually become bankrupt if nominal aggregate demand decreased 
over 50%. 
  On the other hand, inflation-indexed obligations counteract any changes in nominal 
aggregate demand making the real payments constant.  Hence, the real consumption of the 
parties to inflation-indexed obligations will be unaffected by the changes in nominal aggregate 
demand.  If both parties knew with certainty that aggregate supply would not change and if they 
were both risk averse, they would both prefer the certainty of their consumption level provided 
by inflation-indexed contracts compared to nominal contracts. 
  However, if aggregate supply does change, inflation-indexed contracts will filter out 
aggregate-supply-caused inflation as well as aggregate-demand-caused inflation.  Figure 2 
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Figure 1: Effects of Unexpected Changes in 
Nominal Aggregate Demand on the 
Consumption of Parties to Nominal and 
Inflation-Indexed Obligations - 18  - 
contrasts how aggregate supply affects the 
consumption levels of the parties of inflation-
indexed contracts compared to nominal 
contracts when nominal aggregate demand 
remains the same. To normalize the 
consumption of both parties, Figure 2 divides 
their actual consumption by the consumption 
they would experience if aggregate supply 
equals its expected value (Ye). 
These are the same parties as discussed 
in Figure 1.  The receiver of the obligation 
solely relies on that obligation for her consumption.  When aggregate supply equals its expected 
value (Ye), the payer of the obligation would have resources equal to twice his consumption.  
Figure 2 assumes the payer’s resources increase proportionately with aggregate supply. 
  As section 2 discussed, the real payment on a nominal obligation will vary 
proportionately with aggregate supply.   Since the receiver of the payment relies solely on that 
payment for her consumption, her consumption will increase proportionately with aggregate 
supply as shown by the diagonal line going through the origin in Figure 2.   That same diagonal 
line represents the consumption for the payer of the payment.  When aggregate supply decreases, 
his resources decrease but so does his real obligation from the contract.  The result is that both 
the payer and the receiver of the obligation proportionately share in the reduction of aggregate 
supply.
13 
                                                 
13 Under these assumptions, the payer’s consumption, c, equals kY-W/P  Since P=N/Y, c=(k-W/N)Y, which implies 
that c is proportional to Y. 
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  On the other hand, the real payment of an inflation-indexed obligation is constant 
regardless of the level of aggregate supply.  Since the receiver of the inflation-indexed obligation 
solely relies on that obligation, her consumption will be constant regardless of the level of 
aggregate supply.  The payer of the inflation-indexed obligation is guaranteeing that constant real 
payment, despite his resources varying with aggregate supply.  To meet that guarantee, the payer 
will need to decrease his consumption more than proportionately when aggregate supply 
decreases.
14  If the drop in aggregate supply decreased by over 50%, the payer would be 
bankrupt. 
  In conclusion, inflation-indexing does eliminate the bad unanticipated inflation and 
deflation caused by a stochastic nominal aggregate demand.  However it also eliminates the good 
inflation and deflation caused by changes in aggregate supply. 
6. Strict Inflation Targeting 
  Important to understanding inflation targeting is being able to distinguish between 
various forms of inflation targeting.   We define three types of inflation targeting: (a) flexible 
inflation targeting, (b) strict long-run inflation targeting, and (c) strict short-run inflation 
targeting.   Flexible inflation targeting as defined by Svensson (1999) is when the monetary 
authority not only tries to minimize the squared deviation of inflation from its target but also to 
minimize the squared deviations of other variables from their targets such as output and 
unemployment.  Strict short-run inflation targeting is the opposite, where the only thing the 
central bank concerns itself is minimizing the squared deviation of inflation from its target, 
                                                 
14 Since the payers resources equals twice his consumption when aggregate supply equals its expected value, 
kYe=2c(Ye).  Since the real payment he makes is constant then the real payment is kYe/2.  Therefore his 
consumption in general will equal kY-kYe/2.  The ratio of his actual consumption to his consumption if Y=Ye is 
therefore (Y/Ye-1/2).  This means when Y=Ye/2, the payer’s consumption will equal 0. - 20  - 
including inflation in the short run.  Almost no central bank follows a strict short-run inflation 
targeting policy.  However, many central banks such as the Bank of Canada follow a strict long-
run inflation targeting policy, where they make a long-run commitment to a given inflation range 
no matter what, although they are flexible in the short-run.   The problems that we discuss could 
arise from strict long-run inflation targeting as well from strict short-run inflation targeting as 
long as the drop in aggregate supply is a permanent drop. 
  If the central bank is following strict inflation targeting, then even someone using 
nominal contracts would encounter problems similar to the problems with inflation-indexed 
contracts. A central bank following strict inflation targeting will try to set  P P ˆ ￿ ￿ =  where P ˆ ￿  is the 
targeted inflation rate.  Since P=N/Y,  Y N P ￿ ￿ ￿ - = .  Therefore, the central bank will try to 
minimize the deviation of  N ￿ from  Y P ￿ ￿ + ˆ . 
  If Y ￿ is known with certainty, then a central bank following strict inflation targeting will 
try to minimize the deviation of nominal aggregate demand from Ne in Figure 1.  This would be 
good as it would minimize the real effects of aggregate-demand-caused inflation or deflation on 
nominal contracts.  However, if Y ￿  is greater than expected, then the central bank will try to 
increase  N ￿  to compensate.  On the other hand, if Y ￿  is less than expected, then the central bank 
will try to decrease  N ￿  to compensate.   In both cases, the central bank will try to offset the 
effects of aggregate-supply-caused inflation or deflation. - 21  - 
Figure 3 redraws that graph of Figure 2 
assuming the central bank is perfectly able to 
meet its inflation target by compensating for 
changes in aggregate supply with changes in 
nominal aggregate demand.  Strict inflation 
targeting eliminates all unanticipated inflation, 
whether caused by aggregate-demand shifts or 
aggregate-supply shifts.  Strict inflation 
targeting destroys the dynamics of nominal 
contracts, making both nominal and real 
contracts static in both nominal and real terms.  
In the model presented in section 2, strict inflation targeting is Pareto inefficient. 
7. Reflections 
While nominal contracts are static in a nominal sense, they are “really” dynamic.   While 
inflation-indexed contracts are dynamic in a nominal sense, they are “really” static.  While to 
some, strict inflation targeting appears to be a dynamic policy, it really removes the dynamism 
out of contracts making both nominal and inflation-indexed contracts static in both the nominal 
and real senses. 
The First and Second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics state that under 
fairly general assumptions, an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is Pareto efficient and any Pareto-
efficient consumption allocation can be represented by an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.  What 
makes an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium Pareto efficient are its state-contingent securities.  Each 
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Figure 3: Effects of Changes in Aggregate 
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state-contingent security is dynamic around the state for which it pays and static everywhere 
else.  Iff that state occurs, will that security pay.  The problem with state-contingent securities is 
that we need so many of them to complete markets and it is difficult to identify different states of 
nature.   Even with sequential markets involving a numeraire good, we still need nt securities 
where nt is the number of states at time t.  Instead of state-contingent securities, imagine 
securities that are everywhere dynamic, adjusting their real payments to different states of nature 
just as needed by Pareto efficiency.  If such continuously dynamic securities existed, then 
maybe, an equilibrium could be Pareto-efficient with fewer securities than in an Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium. 
In the model of section 2, we found that if any Pareto-efficient consumption allocation 
for each consumer is everywhere proportional to aggregate supply, then the dynamic changes in 
real obligations resulting from nominal contracts do change with aggregate supply exactly as 
needed for Pareto efficiency.  However, the problem with nominal contracts is that they are too 
dynamic.  The real obligations on nominal contracts change when nominal aggregate demand 
changes as well as when aggregate supply changes.  What is needed is a contract where the real 
obligations are affected by aggregate-supply changes but unaffected by nominal-aggregate-
demand changes. 
Eagle and Domian (1995) propose quasi-real bonds that adjust for aggregate-demand-
caused inflation but not for aggregate-supply-caused inflation.  These quasi-real bonds achieve 








where g is the expected long-run 
growth rate in real GDP. Eagle and Domian argue that under rational expectations, the market 
would adjust the quasi-real interest rate to compensate for imperfections in the estimate of the 
contractual parameter g. - 23  - 
With other types of indexation such as wage indexation, nothing like an interest rate 
exists to absorb such imperfections.  Furthermore, the arguments we presented in section 2 that 
consumption should increase proportionately with changes in aggregate supply, apply regardless 
whether that increase is anticipated or not.  Therefore, we propose making the quasi-real 
adjustment by multiplying only by the ratio of the current nominal aggregate demand to the 
nominal aggregate demand in the base year. 
  For example, under a quasi-real wage contract entered into one period ahead of time t, the 





W  where W is the base wage rate.  The real wage rate at 
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= = .  Since W  and Nt-1 are known at time t-1, 
this means that the real wage rate is proportional to aggregate supply regardless of nominal 
aggregate demand at time t. 
  In a multi-period wage contract negotiated at time 0, the quasi-real contract would adjust 









Hence, the real wage rate is still proportional to aggregate supply.  If we assume the perfectly 
competitive firms in section 2 and that the aggregate supply of labor and land are fixed at any 
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which is just exactly what (2) says it should equal.  Quasi-inflation-indexed contracts are 
therefore ideal contracts in this model.   The appendix does show that quasi-inflation-indexed 
contracts for wages, rent, social security and bonds result in a Pareto-efficient equilibrium in the 
model discussed in section 2. 
  While there will be practical issues in the application of quasi-real contracts such as the 
reliability and lagged availability of nominal GDP information, such issues are similar to the 
practical issues of inflation-indexed contracts.
15  We will leave those practical issues to be dealt 
with in future literature. 




t , the real wage 


















= = = .  Taking the logarithm of both sides and 
differentiating with respect to time gives  Y ￿ ￿ = w  since W and N0 are predetermined.  This means 
that quasi-real wage rates will insure that the real wage rate changes proportionately with 
aggregate supply. 
  Some examples can help show how the real obligations on quasi-real contracts will 
remain proportional to aggregate supply.  Let us continue to discuss the wage rate for these 
examples, although the discussion would apply to all quasi-real obligations.  Suppose nominal 
aggregate demand does not change, but that aggregate supply increases by 1%.  Then the 




t  and would not change.  
                                                 
15 Given technology, a better measure of nominal aggregate demand itself might be developed which would be more 
timely than nominal GDP, which is a supply measure.  If such a measure was developed, quasi-real contracts may 
then have less timing issues that do pure inflation-indexed contracts. - 25  - 
However, the price level will decrease by 1%, causing the real wage to increase by 1%, which 
matches the 1% increase in aggregate supply. 
Next, suppose nominal aggregate demand increases by 1% while aggregate supply 




t , the nominal wage rate would increase by 1%.  
However, the price level would also increase by 1%, offsetting the increase in the nominal wage 
rate.  Therefore, the real wage rate remains unchanged. 
Finally, suppose that aggregate supply decreases by 1% and that the central bank follows 
strict inflation targeting and causes nominal aggregate demand to also decrease by 1%.  




t , the 1% decrease in nominal aggregate demand will cause the nominal wage rate to fall 
by 1%.  Since the price level does not change, that means the real wage rate also falls by 1%, 
which matches the 1% drop in aggregate supply.  Thus, quasi-real contracts retain the dynamic 
proportional relationship between real obligations and aggregate supply even when the central 
bank follows strict inflation targeting. 
Given that not all contracts will be rewritten as quasi-real contracts, that some contracts 
will continue to be nominal, what should a central bank try to do if not strict inflation targeting?  
Our answer is nominal income targeting. 
Technically, the model of section 2 indicates that the central bank should keep nominal 
aggregate demand from changing even if aggregate supply is expected to increase,
 16  which 
would mean we would expect deflation. However, as the Appendix discusses, the modeling 
methodology of section 2 does not include some realities of the problems of deflation; in - 26  - 
particular, in reality nominal interest rates cannot be negative because in reality one can hold 
money from one period to another.  As normally recommended by proponents of nominal 
income targeting, we recommend targeting nominal aggregate demand to grow at a rate so that 
the expected inflation rate is somewhere around 1 to 2 percent.  Let ge be the expected growth 
rate in real GDP and let p ˆ be the desired expected inflation rate.  We recommend that the central 
bank announce its intentions to increase nominal aggregate demand at the rate ge+p ˆ , which will 
result in an inflation rate of p ˆ if real GDP does grow as expected.  However, the central bank 
should not deviate the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand even if GDP grows at a 
different rate. 
To some extent, strict nominal income targeting is not that different from flexible 
inflation targeting with escape clauses for real shocks.  However, one of the justifications for 
inflation targeting is the transparency of monetary policy.  Strict nominal income targeting is 
much more transparent than is “flexible inflation targeting with exceptions”.  In particular, 
"flexible inflation targeting with exceptions" does not state what should be done when aggregate 
supply changes unexpected and/or permanently.  As Federal Reserve Board Governor Gramlich 
said on January 13, 2000, in the case of aggregate-supply-caused inflation, the "most flexible and 
competent central bank in the world would be faced with a difficult dilemma in such 
circumstances--forestall the recession by making inflation worse or limit the inflation by making 
the recession worse."   With strict nominal income targeting, the central bank would be clear as 
to what it should try to do and the central bank can be monitored and judged by the performance 
measure of how closely the central bank meets its published nominal-income target.   The lack of 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 We surmise that a more elaborate model with population growth may imply that nominal aggregate demand 
should increase with population growth. - 27  - 
transparency with flexible inflation targeting makes it difficult for economic agents to predict the 
economic effects of the actions of the central bank since those actions are so nebulous. 
However, if real GDP is expected to increase, then if everyone’s Pareto-efficient 
consumption is proportional to real GDP, then the real obligations on contracts should increase 
with real GDP even if that increase in real GDP is expected.  Under the nominal-income-
targeting policy we propose above, such would not be the case with nominal contracts, but it 
would be the case with quasi-real contracts where the adjustment multiplier is Nt/N0 where 0 is 
the base year.  Therefore, the combination of quasi-real contracts with nominal-income-targeting 
would move our economies closer to Pareto efficiency.
17 
To make the points of this paper, we needed to make certain assumptions. One 
assumption was that the Pareto-efficient consumption allocation was proportional to aggregate 
supply for all consumers.  If consumers have different risk aversion, that assumption would no 
longer hold as some form of insurance contracts would be needed so that the less-risk-averse 
consumers could sell insurance to the more-risk-averse consumers.  Normal quasi-real contracts 
are not insurance contracts and so they by themselves would not be able lead the economy to 
Pareto efficiency. 
 Another assumption was that the consumers’ endowments of land and labor were not 
stochastic.  If they were, then other types of insurance contracts would be needed to reallocate 
that risk. 
The Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Functionality Theorem is a very important Theorem 
having applications that extend well beyond this paper. For example, if the hypotheses of this 
theorem hold, the Theorem implies that there is only one risk that matters in a Pareto-efficient 
                                                 
17 The optimal quasi-real adjusting multiplier may differ in a model that includes a growing propulation.  We leave 
such a model to future research. - 28  - 
equilibrium and that risk concerns aggregate supply.  Since the risk on aggregate supply cannot 
be diversified away, a one-factor model of risk would apply and that one factor would be 
aggregate supply. 
However, the Theorem does rest on the assumption that all the consumption good is 
consumed.  Storage of the consumption good would affect the conclusion.  More importantly, the 
existence of capital would mean that part of aggregate supply will be used for purposes other 
than for consumption.  In particular, if the expected marginal productivity of capital depends on 
past states of nature, an individual’s consumption no longer can be written as a function solely of 
income.  Even so, we do not think the conclusions we have reached in this paper will be 
significantly affected.  However, that change substantially affects the pricing of risk resulting 
possibly with many factors affecting the pricing of risk. 
 Very fundamental to policy are the goals policymakers try to achieve.  Economists’ 
current attitudes towards inflation permeate their goals.  Macroeconomists and monetary 
economists usually encourage monetary and fiscal authorities to pursue the goal of minimizing 
the squared deviation of inflation from its targeted rate in conjunction with other goals such as 
minimizing squared deviations of output from its targeted level (e.g., see Grey, 1976; Fischer, 
1977; and Svensson, 2000).  We argue that those goals are flawed in that they do not distinguish 
good inflation from bad.  Pareto efficiency should be our ultimate goal.  In this paper, Pareto 
efficiency indicates the monetary authority should target aggregate demand (which currently is 
measured by nominal GDP). - 29  - 
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Appendix 
This appendix consists of the following sections: 
A.  Derivation of the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for the model of section 2  (This 
provides the basis to evaluate what is and what is not a Pareto-efficient consumption 
allocation.) 
B.  Proof that the model of section 2 with quasi-real discount bonds and other quasi-real 
contracts is Pareto efficient 
C.  Proof that the model of section 2 with quasi-real, interest-bearing, one-period bonds 
and other quasi-real one-period contracts is Pareto efficient 
D.  Proof that the model of section 2 with nominal bonds and other nominal contracts is 
Pareto efficient when nominal aggregate demand is constant 
E.  Argument that an equilibrium with money being held from one period to another 
cannot be Pareto efficient except under extreme assumptions 
F.  Defense of the “No-Money-Held” methodology for modeling a monetary economy 
 
For parts A through D, we assume that the Pareto-efficient consumption allocation for each 
consumer is a constant proportion of aggregate supply so  it jt jit Y c m ~ ~ =  for all j, i, and t.
18 
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for the model of section 2 
Our approach to determine true Pareto efficiency is to compare the consumption allocation of 
non-Arrow-Debreu equilibria to the allocations under an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.  The 
model of section 2 as applied to an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium consists of  it jt jit Y c m ~ =  for all 
j, i, and t, and the following additional conditions: 
1.  Taking prices, wages, and land rental rates as given, the representative firm chooses its 
demand for labor and land over time to maximize  
                                                 
18 While this assumption is a restriction on a endogenous result of the model, we can generate this result assuming 
consumers have identical CRRA utility functions.  Also, Eagle and Domian (2003) show that this result will occur 
iff all consumers have the same coefficient of relative risk aversion; this coefficient can vary across different time 
periods and different states, but not across different consumers in order to come up with this result. - 32  - 
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The prices paid at time 0 for the state-contingent securities of the consumption good, of 
labor, and of land respectively are  it itW p ,  it itY p , and  it itj p .  We can think about  it W , 
it Y , and  it j  as the prices for the state-contingent securities that would be paid if the 
probability of state i occurring was one.  Because the actual probabilities are less than 
one, the actual prices paid would be the probability multiplied by  it W ,  it Y , and  it j .  We 
formulate the Arrow-Debreu economy in this manner so as to more readily interpret our 
results. 
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constraint, where  ) (× jt U is j’s utility function at time t,  0 j c is j’s consumption at time 0, 
jit c  is j’s consumption in state i at time t,b  is the time preference factor, and  it p is the 
probability of state i occurring at time t.  The budget constraints these consumers would 
face in an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium are that 
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The symbol  0 j L represents a subsidy to j at time 0 (if negative then a tax) for 
redistribution purposes such as social security. We assume the government’s budget is 







0 0.  Since  jit c  equals j’s demand at time 0 for the state-
contingent security that pays one consumption good at time t iff state i occurs, we just 
used  jit c  instead of inventing a new symbol to represent j’s demand for that state-
contingent security.  Similarly, in place of the state-contingent securities for labor and 
land for state i at time t, we use  jt L  and  jt H .   
 
3.  Equilibrium exists when the state-contingent securities markets clear for the consumption 
good, labor, and land for all periods and all states. 
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.  Multiply both sides of both equations by  it itY W and 
then taking expectations, we get: 
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since the supply of labor and land is constant at any point of time. 
 
Since  it jt jit Y c m ~ = , we can rewrite (A1) as: 
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which can further be rewritten as: 
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where the * in place of the i within the expectations operator means that the expectation was 
taken over all i.  
  Equations (A2) through (A8) must hold in an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.  The Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium is such that all markets exist at time 0 only; even if markets were open in 
subsequent periods, no one would trade even if the probabilities of the states change because of 
new information (assuming homogeneous expectations). - 34  - 
Pareto-efficiency of quasi-real equilibrium with discount bonds 
With quasi-real contracts entered into at time 0, the payment at time t will equal the base 
obligation multiplied by 
0 N




 are the base wage and land rent 










 .  The model of 
section 2 as applied to quasi-real contracts where those contracts are set at time 0 consists of 
t jt jt Y ￿ c ~ =  for all j, i, and t, and the following additional conditions: 
1.  Taking prices, wages, and the land rental rate as given, the representative firm chooses its 













W ) H , L f( e P
t ~ ~ ~ ~
0 0
￿ ￿
- -  











c U c U
1 1
0 0 ) ( ) ( p b  subject to the constraints 
￿
=
+ + = +
T
t
j j j jt t j Z H R L W Q V c P
1




Z H R L W Q c P
it
jt jt jt jt jit it
￿ ￿ ￿
+ + + =  
where  jt Q is j’s demand at time 0 for the quasi-real discount bonds that mature at time t, 
where the bond pays one monetary unit multiplied by 
0 N
Nit and  t V is the price of that 
bond at time 0.  The symbol  jt Z
￿
 represents the quasi-real social security obligation of the 
government to j (or if negative from j to the government) at time t.  We assume that the 








.  The consumer 
constraints can be collapsed into the following single budget constraint: 
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3.  Equilibrium exists when the goods, labor, land rental, markets clear for each time t=0..T 
and the quasi-real bond market at time 0 clears. 
 - 35  - 
We now show that quasi-real discount bonds in conjunction with quasi-real indexing of 
wages, rents, and social security results in the same Pareto-efficient consumption allocation 





































.   Then, when 
t jt jt Y ￿ c ~ = , (A9) holds iff (A8) holds for all j, i, and t.  Hence, the consumers' optimization 
problem is satisfied. 
The FONC of the firm’s problem is that for t=0 equations (2) and (3) hold, and for t=1..T: 
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, both of which are constants as they should be since 
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Therefore, the firm’s optimization problem is also satisfied by this equilibrium.  Since this is the 
same consumption allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu model, markets clear.  Q.E.D. 
Pareto-efficiency of quasi-real equilibrium with one-period contracts 
With one-period quasi-real contracts entered into at time t-1, the payment at time t will equal 
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The model of section 2 as applied to these one-period, quasi-real contracts consists of 
it jt jit Y c m ~ =  for all j, i, and t, and the following additional conditions: 
1.  The firm’s optimization problem is the same as in the previous section’s model. 
2.  In this quasi-real economy, consumers will face the following constraints:  
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(The subscripts for the states are suppressed above.) 
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3.  Equilibrium is where the goods market, the labor market, the land market, and the quasi-
real bond market clear each period. 
 - 37  - 


























































for t=1..T-1; we can see that (A12) will hold iff (A8) holds for  it jt jit Y c m ~ =  for all j, i, and 
t.  Also, the first order necessary conditions for the firm’s optimization will be satisfied 
just as they were for the previous section.  Q.E.D. 
Pareto-efficiency of equilibrium with one-period nominal contracts 
when nominal aggregate demand does not change 
When nominal aggregate demand does not change, quasi-real contracts and nominal 
contracts behave the same way.  Therefore, since one-period quasi-real contracts in the 
previous section were Pareto efficient, so must these one-period nominal contracts given that 
nominal aggregate demand does not change.  Q.E.D. 
 
Argument that normally a money equilibrium cannot be truly Pareto 
Efficient when consumers differ in their consumption. 
The two fundamental theorems of welfare economics as applied to Arrow-Debreu equilibria 
state that under fairly general assumptions (1) an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient and (2) any Pareto-efficient consumption allocation can be represented by an 
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.  Therefore, if we can get a non-Arrow-Debreu equilibrium that 
has the same consumption allocation as does an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, then that 
consumption allocation is Pareto efficient; if we cannot, then the consumption allocation is 
not Pareto efficient.  Holding money from one period to another will generally create a - 38  - 
distortion from an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, which will then be a distortion from Pareto-
efficiency. 
The logic of the above paragraph creates a “catch 22”.  If our model has money being held 
from period to period, we will not be able to get true Pareto efficiency.  Without money being 
held, then how can we get nominal effects? 
The above “catch 22” may have contributed to economists’ blindness to why aggregate-
supply-caused inflation is good in the Pareto sense.  We answer this “catch 22”, with a 
methodology where money is not held from one period to another, but where nominal aggregate 
demand is exogenous or exogenously stochastic. 
The above logic does depend on our statement that holding money will create a distortion 
from an Arrow-Debreu economy.  To help see this, let’s simplify our model by assuming perfect 
foresight.  With perfect foresight, the state-contingent securities become the equivalent of pre-
paid future contracts.  Let  jt F be j’s demand for the future contract that pays off at time t.  Then 
(A1) becomes: 
( ) ￿ ￿
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j   (A 13) 
and 
jt jt F c ~ ~ =   (A 14) 
for all t=1..T, where the tilde mark above each variable indicates it is the equilibrium value for 
the Arrow-Debreu economy. 
  If we add money being held to this Arrow-Debreu economy, these constraints become: 
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  (A 16) 
for all t=1..T, where Mjt is the money demanded by j at time t to be held to time t+1, Rjt is the 
gross nominal return on money and Zjt is j’s monetary endowment at time t.  If one sets these 
monetary endowments all to zero, our argument will still remain valid (and even more obvious).  
However, monetary endowments may be necessary to get money into the system. 
Next we derive the conditions that must exist between the changes in the money demands 
and the monetary endowments in order for the consumption allocation to be the same as in the 
Arrow-Debreu economy.  To do so, from here on we assume that  jt jt c c ~ = for all j and for all t.  
We also assume the values of the economy do not change, i.e.,  t t W = W
~
,  t t Y = Y
~
,  t t j j ~ = , as 
changing these values will almost certainly create distortions from the Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium. 
Special Case:  jt jt F F
~
= .  In this case, the holding of prepaid futures contracts does not 
change.  Subtracting (A13) from (A15) and (A14) from (A16) we conclude that  0 0 j j Z M = and 
jt jt t j jt Z R M M = - -1 , .   In other words the monetary endowments in each period must equal the 
change in money demand (net of the return on money) to avoid a distortion away from the 
Arrow-Debreu consumption allocation.  Since we see no reason for these conditions to hold, we 
conclude that, in the special case where the holdings of prepaid future contracts do not change, 
holding money will generally cause a distortion from the Arrow-Debreu consumption allocation. 
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  (A 17) 
This means that the sum of the real present values of the change in the j’s money demand 
(net of money’s return) over j’s life must equal the sum of the real present values of j’s monetary 
endowments over j’s life.  If (A17) does not hold, then holding money will create a distortion 
from the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.  Since we can see no reason why (A17) would hold, we 
conclude that holding money will generally create such a distortion. 
We are not saying this distortion will be significant, but in welfare economics, we usually do 
not talk about “almost” Pareto efficiency.  If the distortions are insignificant, then that is just 
another reason to use our “no-money-held” methodology.  The final section of the Appendix 
further defends this methodology. 
Defense of no-money-held methodology 
In response to the "catch 22" of the previous section, the no-money-held methodology 
assumes an exogenous or stochastically exogenous nominal aggregate demand with no 
money being held from one period to the next.   While unrealistic, we believe the distortions 
from money being held are in many situations insignificant and can be ignored.   However, 
we do recognize that we have to be careful.  In particular, with our methodology, nominal 
interest rates can be negative.  However, in the real world where money can be held from one 
period to another, nominal interest rates must be nonnegative.  Even so, we should recognize 
that if the economy does get to the point where nominal interest rates “should” be negative 
but cannot, then the economy will then not be able to reach Pareto efficiency. - 41  - 
In today’s monetary economies, monetary aggregates are only loosely connected to nominal 
aggregate demand.  The no-money-held methodology changes the focus from the monetary 
aggregates to nominal aggregate demand.  
While we do recognize that the assumption of no money being held from one period to 
another is unrealistic, by the previous section we must make that assumption if we are to 
have any hope of obtaining true Pareto efficiency.  Even if no money being held is 
unrealistic, we can present a story that will make the model consistent.  The following 
sequence of events within each period does create a nominal aggregate demand without any 
money being held from period to period:
19 
1.  The central bank announces the level of nominal aggregate demand this period. 
2.  Firms produce;  it a  is realized meaning aggregate output is realized. 
3.  Firms enter into agreements with the central bank, where each firm j agrees to sell 
consumers xj units of the consumption good at the price Pt where xj is its output and 
where Pt= Nt/Yt.  In return, the central bank “lends” the firms money equal to Ptxj. 
 
4.  Firms pay wages to their laborers and rent to their landlords.  Since each firm makes zero 
economic profit, the amount it pays out will equal Ptxj. 
 
5.  The government will collect taxes and will pay social security. 
6.  The consumers will use their money to meet their bond obligations and buy more bonds. 
7.  The consumers will pay money to the firms for the consumption good. 
8.  The firms will return the money to the central bank by the end of the period.  The central 
bank does not charge interest as long as the money is returned within the period.  Thus, 
neither firms nor consumers will hold any money from period to period. 
  
                                                 
19 Unfortunately, the story we present is one where velocity is a constant one, whereas we really do not wish this 
methodology to be associated with a constant velocity.  Other stories consistent with the No-Money-Held 
methodology probably could be told with a varying velocity, but we do not attempt to do so in this paper. 